Equivalents have been established between the determinacy of games played at various intervals of the di erence hierarchy of co-analytical sets, with embeddings of inner models, by the work of Martin. Taken together with a theorem of Harrington, these yield a strictly level-by-level description for most levels.
Introduction
It has been known for some while that the determinacy of all two person Gale-Stewart games (cf 14] or 17]) having payo a co-analytic subset of R, is equivalent to the existence, for every real number r, of a non-trivial embedding j : L r ?! L r (or \8r 2 Rr # exists"). In this paper we shall investigate the last remaining open cases concerning the determinacy of games with payo a set located in the di erence hierarchy based on co-analytic subsets of R. We shall identify R throughout with Baire space ! ! .
If hB j i is a sequence of co-analytic sets, with B = , then we let the di erence kernel of this sequence be the set A = df fxj the least such that x = 2 B is odd g (an odd ordinal is of course of the form + 2n + 1). A set A is called -1 1 if it can be represented as such a di erence kernel. These sets are discussed by Hausdor in 8] (see Ch.17) . For a particular pointclass ? of subsets of R, we abbreviate the determinacy of games with payo a set in ? as ?-Determinacy. Martin showed that the existence of r # for every real r implies co-analytic determinacy ( 13] ). He also proved that ( S <! 2 -1 1 )-Determinacy is actually equivalent to \O # exists" (for the appropriate e ective coanalytic sets). Further, Martin showed that 3-1 1 -Determinacy would yield the existence of O # , and then Harrington ( 7] ) reduced this to 1 (! 2 < < ! 2 :2) For any real r r y exists, (that is there is a non-trivial embedding j : L ;r ?! L ;r , where L ;r j = \ is a normal measure on some ordinal ", and j + 1 = id + 1.) (! 2 < < ! 2 ( + 1)) For any real r, there exists a \sharp" for a model containing r and measurable cardinals, that is there is a non trivial embedding j : L~ ;r ?! L~ ;r with~ a -sequence of normal measures on~ i inside L~ ;a and j sup i< i = id:
The natural question arising from this picture is to ll in the gaps that had been left open for of the form ! 2 for any countable > 0. The following was known. Theorem 2 (Martin 16] ) There exists a measurable cardinal ) ! 2 -1 1 -Det. Does a Ramsey cardinal su ce? The answer turns out to be a rmative. In fact less than an ! 1 -Erd} os cardinal will do (see Theorem 6 below). The last theorem of Martin was stated for ! 2 but the same proof is adaptable to show that the existence of measurable cardinals yields ! 2 -1 1 -Det. (In fact on more generalised spaces of the form X ! for any X of cardinality smaller than the rst measurable cardinal (see 14] ).)
It is easy to see that a full measure on a cardinal is more than enough for ! 2 -1 1 -Det. (as an inspection of the proof in 16] already shows). The strategies for such games are codable as reals.
In L we have such determinacy, but R L = R K where the latter K denotes the core model below a measurable cardinal. Hence such determinacy holds in the latter model. It is not hard to see that it will also hold in proper inner models of the full K (given the existence of such an L ). In the spirit of the above we seek some sharp of a model, whose existence is equivalent to this determinacy. Since such models are generated by \mice" the question boils down to nding mice equivalent to these levels of determinacy. We dub such a mouse \clever". For example, for ! 3 -1 1 -Determinacy, a class inner model with ! many measurable cardinals must be too much, whilst sharps must exist for the canonical inner model with any nite number of measures in them. Hence it is perhaps not so surprising to think of looking for a weaker theory in which a proof of the existence of strategies could go through. An admissible model with measurable cardinals in order type !, with wellfounded iterates turns out to be exactly right: the \least" such mouse (in the canonical mouse ordering) engendering such a structure is then the mouse sought. By L owenheim-Skolem considerations it must be countable.
To keep it clear which case is being dealt with at any particular moment we say a mouse M is an -mouse if is the order type of those ordinals which are measurable in M. We shall de ne a technical property of -mice which we call \cleverness" and then show this is the right equivalent sought.
In general for a recursive ordinal, let B ! ! 2 be a lightface 1 1 set. If E ! 2 codes a recursive wellorder of length , let jnj E be the rank of n in this ordering. Let B = fx 2 ! ! j hn; xi 2 B; where jnj E = g. Each B 2 1 1 and if A is the di erence kernel of the hB j i (with B = again), then A is said to be -1 1 . We deal just with these lightface classes -the relativisation to boldface classes with real parameters being uniform and straightforward.
To state the Main Theorem we use the following notation: letc denote an ascending sequence of ordinals. Let A c] = hL c]; 2;ci be the smallest transitive admissible set containing the functioñ c. (Hence > supc). A jR-formula is one of the form 9x 0 < c i0 9x 1 < c i1 9x j < c ij where is a boolean combination of 1 and 1 formulae in the language L f _2;_ cg . An R-formula is then a jR-formula for some j < ! The Main Theorem 3 Let > 0 be recursive. The following are equivalent:
1. ! 2 -1 1 Determinacy.
2. There exists a clever -mouse. The third clause is thus an indiscernibility property for ! sequences, with respect to the smallest admissible sets containing them. The cleverness property is o cially de ned at De nitions 1.5 and 1.10, but for Lim( ) one may prove the following alternative characterisation.
Theorem 4 For Lim( ) 2) can be replaced by 2'): \There is an iterable model Q with Q j = KP+\ there exists measurable cardinals"."
The structure Q of this theorem, is not a mouse in the modern sense, but is \iterable" in the sense of having wellfounded iterated ultrapowers. In fact for Lim( ) 2') is really the motivating property (as indicated above) and we call the -mouse that generates such a model Q, a \clever"
-mouse merely to uniformise, somewhat arti cially, the nomenclature. Cleverness for successor is essentially a 1 -Rowbottom property for models hQ;Fi j = KP + V = L F ] + \F is a sequence of normal measures". HereF is a predicate sequence, in particular the last measure is not a set in the model. (The version 2') of the last theorem for successor is false.) For the successor case we can state a su cient condition purely in terms of traditional large cardinals.
Theorem 5 Let = + 1 be countable. If there is a sequence h i ji < i of measurable cardinals, and an almost < ! 1 -Erd} os above them, then ! 2 -1 1 -Determinacy holds, for spaces of the form X ! with X < 0 .
For the space ! ! we can do a little more when = 1. Theorem 7 Con(ZFC + wCC !1 ) ) Con(ZFC + ! 2 -1 1 -Det) ) ) Con(ZFC + 8X On(X # exists) + 8B ! 1 (B is universally Baire ! ! 9r 2 R(B 2 L r]))) ) Con(ZFC + 1 direction that some strong version of the 3 here implied 1 (it is not clear whether this was really, or only apparently, a strictly stronger version.) The author would like to take this opportunity to express his warm thanks to Martin for explaining these ideas to him, for making many suggestions, and for his forbearance in hearing out on too many occasions some of the arguments here; and to the referee for making suggestions to clarify the presentation.
In x3 a forcing argument is used to show that the iteration points of the least clever -mouse yield a class C satisfying ? . To motivate the forcing: consider M = hM; F n i n<! an inner model of ZFC + \F n is a normal measure on n ". Let : hM; F n i ?! h f M; e F n i be the iteration de ned by iterating rst F 0 ! many times sending 0 to~ 0 , with iteration points C 0 ; then F 1 ! many times to~ 1 with iteration points C 1 , and so on for each n < !. Let the complete sequence of iteration points beC = df hC n j n < !i. Let For what product forcing, if any, then, is the whole sequenceC f M-generic? (Not nite support, as that collapses ! 1 ; nor the full product of the P~ n , since, for example, ifc = df hc n 0 jn < !i with c n 0 = min C n , thenc = 2 f M.)
Much of x2 & x3 uses known modes of argument. However we need to apply these arguments in models of a restricted set theory, and much of what we do is justifying these arguments by checking them through in this context: it is all in the details. x4 provides clever -mice from ! 2 -1 1 determinacy. We assume there are no such mice, de ne an ! 2 -1 1 game, and show that neither player has a winning strategy. The type of game considered involve the players constructing !-models of certain theories, and using a technique going back to games of Martin and Solovay, to ensure that the suprema of the ranks of !-blocks of wellorders agree, and such suprema are used to \check-up" on the truth or falsity of sentences in the theory.
The latter is roughly \V = K " plus assertions that certain of these suprema are regular or singular in the core models of their respective models. Were the Covering Lemma to fail over true K, we should easily have the existence of such models containing true mice; hence if we have any strategy for player I, then II is seen to have the ability to choose ordinals so as never to actually lose; and vice versa if II has a purportedly winning strategy, then we may regard a counter-play by I as choosing ordinals in a way to force II to continuously play false mice, but in such a fashion as would imply the existence of clever -mice.
The arguments establishing Theorems 5 -7 appear in x1:3:3.
1 Some Mauslehre The coiteration of two mice exists, with the result that for some M is an initial segment (not necessarily proper) of the N hierarchy (or vice versa.) In x4 we shall need to coiterate premice possibly without wellfounded iterates. So in fact we do allow the possibility of illfounded ultrapowers occurring in coiterations. But the comparison process still works to compare the wellfounded parts (\WFP") of the premice arising. Thus we allow the models in the coiteration to be illfounded, but the indices must come from the wellfounded parts of both models. (ii) is a wellordering on mice.
But the extension of these facts to premice is in general false. We need to examine the relationship between mice and the inner models they generate. Unfortunately, we must to a certain extent also look at some structures in the \old-style" mouse hierarchies corresponding to new style mice. These old-style hierarchies are more convenient for the forcing arguments of x3. To avoid confusion, we shall use the term \mouse-structure" or just \structure" when examining the old-style hierarchy. Clearly there should be a (1-1) correspondence between old-style mouse-structures that generate inner models (the \critical" mouse-structures) and the new-style mice -although the very di erent construction of the hierarchies obscures this somewhat. This correspondence is given in Corollary 5.3.
De nition 1.2 Suppose M is a mouse and = otf jM j = \ is a measurable cardinal"g then we call M an -mouse.
We note that an active mouse has the nal measure F M a predicate over the mouse, but is not a set of the mouse. For Lim( ) we have all the measures as sets of the mouse (by acceptability), although the sequence of measurables may be co nal in On \ M. There are thus two cases to analyse: for M an -mouse, with a successor, or a limit.
M an -mouse for Lim( )
We consider M = hJ E M ; E M ; i, where there is an ascending sequence of indices h i ji < i with M j = \E i is a full measure on i^( i < j ) i < j )". Then by acceptability P( i ) M 
The old-style hierarchy of constructing with the usual relative constructibility hierarchy from a sequence of ltersF = hF i ji < i with each F i = E M i yields a model of the form hJF ; 2;Fi, where the sets appear in a completely di erent order. Further it may be the case that the F i continue to be measures at a greater ordinal height > . It may even seem unclear a priori that we get all the subsets of i from M constructed inside such a structure. We should also want that from an old style structure such as that above, a mouse can be constructed, at least for certain kinds of such structures. Let M; E M ; F i , etc. be as above.
De nition 1.3 M = the maximal so that JF j = 8i < (F i is a normal measure on i ). Case 1 M = 0 + 1.
As P( i ) does not exist in Q, some Y 2 P( i ) \ QnJF 0 . Hence n;F 0 i for some n, and JF 0 is a ne-structural n-iterate of its n-core, which may be coded as a subset of i in M. We may ( ne-structurally) iterate its measures F k (for k > i) to any sequence of M-cardinals i < i+1 < < m < m+1 < < k < m+1 for i < k < , with h k jm < k < i 2 M, where we have assumed without loss of generality that i m. Let the iteration points of the k'th measure here be hc k j < k i (k > m) and hc k j < k i (k m). Let the resulting structure be JG with G k at k ( or k ). LetG k G k be the nal segment lter generated by hc k j < k i(k > m) (respectively hc k j < k i(k m)). Then~e G is the continuation of the measuresG (in the sense of 4] Ch.11, where this is argued for a single measure). And P( i )\J~e G +1 = P( i )\Def(JG ) (see op. cit. where this is argued for a single measure.) But then Q is in turn an iterate above m of J~e G +1 where the latter is in M. By the same continuability argument P( m )\JF m+1 = P( m )\Def(Q) = P( m )\DefJ~e G +1 M. So X 2 M \ P( m ) and is measured by F m after all -a contradiction.
Case 2 M a limit.
Then for some limit i < , for co nally many 0 in M , new subsets of i appear and, co nally often, 1;F 0 i . If so, then Q = Q M is essentially a union of mouse-structures all of whose old \core-structures" are coded as subsets of i , but are iterated for joint comparison to i+1 < < k < for i < k < . But M is acceptable, i.e. H M i + 2 M, and so such a comparison could again be e ected inside M using any sequence of k ordered as above for m < k < (assuming without loss of generality again that m i). Let Hn . Thinking of K n as a union of strong mice of H n , and noting that H n j = \N is strong " ) H m j = \N is strong " for any m n (since any counterexample to strength if it existed could be found in (H ) Hn where H n j = \ = M + "), we may set N Q = S n K n = hJ E ; E; i where = sup i< i . Then N Q thinks it is a model of V = K.
(1) N Q j = \ n is measurable with normal measure F n " for n < . Proof: In H n+1 we have that hH + n ; F n i is amenable and iterable. K n+1 = (K) Hn+1 and if = ( + n ) K n+1 the usual arguments about the construction of K with a short sequence of measures show that a)~ = ( + n ) Hn+1 b) hK n+1 ; F n i is a \beaver" structure i.e., F n = E K n+1 . Q.E.D.(1) (2) H n jMj n j: Proof: ( + n ) K n+1 = ( + n ) Hn+1 (by a) in (1)), and by b) the measure E K n+1 2 K n+1 on P( n ) is just The corollary gives the sought for correspondence. We only use this to the extent that the -mouse that yields the desired determinacy gives rise to a certain Q M with certain properties. We further note that the argument of Proposition 1.2 could also be used to show that if we took Q 0 = JF as any initial segment of Q M , satisfying \8n < H n exists^F n \ Q 0 a normal measure on n ", then constructing N Q 0 = (K ) Q 0 we have that the latter is a premouse, which will again have wellfounded 0 -ultrapowers. Suppose we now take any amenable structure Q = hJF ;Fi j = \8n < F n is a normal measure on n^P ( n ) exists". Let = sup n< n . As usual let 1 Q = df ( 1 (Q) \ P(! ) * jQj). Lemma 1.4 Q j = KP ) 1 Q . Remark: By Q j = KP we mean that it models the KP axioms in a language L f _2; _ F g , so augmented by predicate symbols for theF .
Proof: Suppose 1 Q n . That is, suppose for some 1 ' ; p 2 ] <! , '(v 0 ; p) '(v 0 ; p) de nes a new 1 (Q) subset X = f < n jQ j = '( ; p)g of n . Let X = f < n jJF j = '( ; p)g of n . Then S < X = X. Let T = df f jX 6 = X +1 g. Then T is co nal in . Let f( ) be the 'th element of T. But the order type of T must be less than P( n ) Q , and then f is a 1 function, co nal in , with domain an ordinal of Q! This contradicts KP.
Q.E.D.
Continue to let Q be as in the last lemma and suppose it is a KP model. Now consider the one step 0 -ultrapower of Q using functions in Q and, e.g., the measure F 0 on 0 . Let : Q ?! F0 Q 0 be the resulting 0 , co nal, and hence 1 preserving map. We suppose that Q 0 is wellfounded and so we identify it with its transitive collapse. Lemma 1.5 is 2 -preserving. Proof: Suppose Q 0 j = 9z8t'(z; t; (x)) for ' 2 0 ; x 2 Q. Let f 2 Q witness this, i.e., let Q 0 j = 8t'( f] F0 ; t; (x)) . Let X = f jQ j = 8t'(f( ); t; x)g 0 . then X 2 Q 1 (f; x) and by Lemma 1.4 X 2 Q. If X 6 = we are done, so we show X 2 F 0 . If not, X 2 F 0 , i.e., f jQ j = 9t:'(f( ); t; x)g 2 F 0 \ Q. As Q j = KP nd t( ) 2 Q so that f jQ j = :'(f( ); t( ); x)g 2 F 0 \ Q. But then Q 0 j = :'( f]; t]; (x)) contradicting the de nition of f.
Q.E.D. Lemma 1.6 a) supf ( n )jn < g = supf n jn < g. b) On \ Q 0 = On \ Q. c) Q 0 j = KP^ 1 Q 0 .
Proof: a) As each of the n 's are regular in Q, then for n > 0; ( n ) = n . b) is conal: but for all < we may take the following ultrapower inside the admissible set Q:
: JF ?! Ult(JF ; F 0 ) and then is in Q. So Q = S < sup ran . So On \ Q 0 = . c): Now if Q 0 j = 8 9 < 9 0 '( ; 0 ; f]) where ' 2 1 ; f] 2 Ult(Q; F 0 ), then Q j = 8 9 < 9 0 \9 (Ult(JF ; F 0 ) j = '( ; 0 ; f]))" But the 1 (Q) formula in quotes de nes a map of co nally into . By Q's admissibility this map cannot be total, and hence neither can it be over Q 0 . That 
Q.E.D.
We see that in particular if M is the < -least -mouse with Q = Q M j = KP, then 1 Q = is the largest cardinal in Q. Further the 2 -preservation property above yields: Lemma 1.7 Let Q j = KP; let Qe Q : Q ?! e Q be an iterated ultrapower map of the structure Q (taking the usual ultrapowers). Then if hc i j jj < i i for i < are the iteration points of the measures F i (and their images) then fc i j jj < i ; i < g are 2 indiscernibles for h e Q; ran Qe Q i.
De nition 1.5 Let Lim( ). Let M be an -mouse. Then M is clever if Q M j = KP.
Let M have F i on i for i < as the full measures in the structure. As P( i ) M = P( i ) Q if we iterate the structure Q in the natural way, the same set of iteration points of the i`th measure will occur. So we de ne:
De nition 1.6 (i) C i M = df the class of iteration points of M using the i`th measure F i repeatedly.
(
Hence using M or Q we should arrive at the same class here. The Dodd-Jensen core model K DJ , as de ned in 4] is the class which is the union of all mousestructures, as they de ned them. Again our K M (although not de ned in this way) will be a union of mouse-structures, that is, mouse-structures over the bottom part of the predicate with the full measures in it. In K M , if is a cardinal greater than the sup i< i de ne the JF hierarchy using the F i for i < as de ned above, but now take the top lter F = F , the latter the cub lter on . We may compare all old style mouse-structures in H K M of the form A = hJF ;U ;F ; Ui by iterating the top measure U many times, to comparison in the hJ~F ;F ;F ; F i-hierarchy. The union of all these iterates is the \Q-structure at ". The point is that the Q-structure at in K M constructs from the cub hierarchy over the predicateF all of H K M , and having constructed all such sets, is no longer a normal measure in JF +1 . We list some facts about these Q-structures most of which are straightforward generalisations of the K DJ below a single measure. any set E K = fhX; i j < ^X 2 E K g; then for lim( ), assuming E K de ned for < , and writing E for E K , set: E K ' : F where F is any lter such that hJ E ; E; Fi is a strong mouse : if there is no such F:
One may argue that if there is a candidate for such an F, then it is unique, hence K is properly de ned.
Cleverness
The crucial property of a clever mouse M is that its corresponding Q-structure has the following Rowbottom property. We shall use this as the de nition of cleverness.
De nition 1.12 Let (') fv 0 ; : : :; v r?1 g), and for any limit point of C M , with max~ < '(~ ; p)g. Then~ 2 Z , so by indiscernibility Z 2 (F M ) r . By cleverness then there is X 2 FM \Q, with X] r Z. By admissibility ofQ nd = X < On \Q, with JFM j = '(~ ; p) for all~ 2 X] r . As h i i i< generates FM, we have that 9 < (C M \ )n X. AsQ and (without loss of generality) take q 2 0 ] <! to be chosen so that X = f < ! jQ j = '( ; q)g is in FM. As f n g n 0 generates FM; 9m8n m n 2 X. HenceQ j = '( n ; q) for all su ciently large n. As M is inwardly re ecting, pick N 2 H M witnessing this. Hence Q N ! j = '( n ; q) for all su ciently large n. As C M C N , and Q N ! is a proper initial segment ofQ by Fact 1.4 (i),
We can view this as saying that once we have clever mice we can no longer nd an ordinal
, so that our model K M can be characterised by the set of G odel numbers of 1 formulae, with parameters from , true on indiscernibles in some (or any) su ciently large Q-structure.
The following is an indication of how weak cleverness really is. Remark: If we assume there are no critical -mice, then this implies that for no mouse can we even have two lters with a common critical point above the 'th measure, since if E M ; E M were such with = crit(E M ) = crit(E M ) and < we cannot have 1 Mj < , since by soundness considerations this would collapse over Mj . The usual argument shows: Lemma 1.12 Let = + 1. Let M be the -least clever -mouse.
N is a mouse with 1 N = !; N M . But it is easy to see that cleverness carries down to Q and N. Hence N = M .
Let hQ;Fi j = \F j is a normal measure on j ", and let it be transitive and amenable with each F j jQj. Let 
The reader is invited to check that because X 2 Q the usual proof of the above can be e ected in KP, and we then have that it holds in Q. Cleverness implies something similar for X 2 1 (Q). Lemma 1.14 Let M be a clever +1-mouse, and Q = Q M ; = crit(F) where F = F M . Let F n be the n-fold product measure of F. Suppose Z ] n for some n < !, and suppose Z 2 Q 1 (fpg)\F n . Then 9Z 2 Q \ F( Z ] n Z).
Proof: By induction on n. For n = 1 this is just the de nition of cleverness. Let n = m + 1 and suppose the lemma proven for m. Let '; p be such that Z = fh 1 ; : : :; n ijQ j = '(h 1 ; : : :; n i; p)g. Then T h 1 ; : : :; m i = f n jh 1 ; : : :; n i 2 Zg 2 Q 1 (fh 1 ; : : :; m i; p). Then for an R 0 . An R-formula is a jR-formula for some j < !. Proof: Letẽ =c`d. By our assumptions on these sequences, e i = c i = d i for i < n and there is a minimal r < ! with e i = c i = d i for i > r. As A ẽ] j = 9y 1 < c n 9y 2 The functions x ?! x and h ; ni ?! n may be taken as recursive.
Let us say I plays well if I plays so as not to be badly lost at any stage, and further If there is no such , then II has a winning strategy. We describe a position without a rank as a non-losing position for II. Given s = hs 0 ; : : :; s 2n?1 i a non-losing position for II, and any s 2n so that s a hs 2n i 2 T there is a least (in the canonical wellordering for A) s 2n+1 that II can play so that s a hs 2n i a hs 2n+1 i is non-losing for II. By always choosing such a least element, this xes a strategy for II (albeit not an element of A) in the case that I has no winning strategy. The rank function rk is de ned by a parameterless 1 recursion over A (since the actual parameter h@ n jn < ! i is de nable in the language). The predicate \s is a non-losing position for II" is then easily seen to be A 1 (h@ n jn < ! i).
Lemma 2.2 Assume II has a winning strategy in G . Then II has a winning strategy in G.
Proof: We integrate by pretending that in addition to the moves a 2n that I makes in G, I also makes ordinal moves from C, 2n , so that I \plays well" in G . We need to argue that the integer moves provides for II as a 2n+1 in G are independent of the choices 2n 2 C, and to a limited extent, so are the ordinal moves 2n+1 .
Wellorder positions in T by the lexicographic ordering on the concatenation of integers and ordi- Let h m jm < ! i = h 2i ji ni`h@ l jl < ! i, h 0 m jm < ! i = h 0 2i ji ni`h@ l jl < ! i Let J ! be the nite set fj < ! j 9i( j = 2i ) g. Then also J = fj < ! j 9k( j = 0 2k )g as I must play well. Then A h m jm < ! i]; A h 0 m jm < ! i] have the same domains as A and the game G is de nable in these structures using h@ l jl < ! i which in turn is de nable from the nite set J .
The set of non-losing positions for II is still 1 over all these structures and de nes the same sets.
(s) tells II to take the least pair ha 2n+1 ; 2n+1 i so that s a ha 2n+1 ; 2n+1 i is non-losing. But also, by (1), for j < n h a 2j+1 ; 2j+1 i has been chosen in an R-way from s 2j + 1. We thus have ha; i = ha 2n+1 ; 2n+1 i () Hence a 2n+1 = a 0 2n+1 . This proves 2a). For 2b) we use the remarkability property of Lemma 2.1 above. Let m be least so that for some i n m = 2i = l for some > (if there is such an 2i , otherwise the result is trivial). II uses the same strategy on both sequences to nd his ordinal moves, hence our remarkability property from Lemma 2.1 and the inequalities (A) and (B) above yield immediately 0 2n+1 = 2n+1 .
Q.E.D. (2) We de ne the strategy for II in G in the usual way and we use the above relative independence of II's ordinal moves from those of I to show that it is winning. These quite standard details follow.
Assuming a position (a 0 ; : : :; a 2n ) in G, and assuming that s = (ha 0 ; 0 i; ha 1 ; 1 i; : : : : : :; ha 2n ; 2n i) has been chosen by II in G with 2i coming from C, so that in s I has played well, and II has used to determine the ha 2i+1 ; 2i+1 i, II sets (a 0 ; : : :; a 2n ) to be the integer part of ha 2n+1 ; 2n+1 i = (s). Since the strategy has been de ned by assuming I has played well, and II has used , and since we have by 2a) and 2b) that the integers a 2i+1 and F (n) for odd are independent of I's moves F 0 (n) for even 0 > the argument, is familiar: we de ne F by induction for < 0 . Assume it de ned for 0 < . even: Let = sup 0 < F Proof: Since I has a winning strategy, h i is a losing position for II, so 9 < rk(h i) = . We de ne analogously the concept of II playing well, this happens if II plays so as not to lose badly at any stage, and:
Analogous to (2) we have: In proving (2') we assume of that it picks the lexicographic least ha 2n ; 2n i that will reduce ranks. Since the rank function is A 1 so is : let s = h (h i); Being 1 -de nable with domain an element of A, in this case 2 A. The proof of (2') is then somewhat easier than that for (2). We omit the rather repetitive details here. (ha 0 ; : : :; a n?1 i) is de ned for positions ha 0 ; : : :; a n?1 i 2 G, by assuming that s = hha 0 ; 0 i; : : :; ha 2n?1 ; 2n?1 ii has been chosen by I in G using and assuming that II plays well. (ha 0 ; : : :; a n?1 i) is then set equal to the integer part of (s).
(3') is winning for I in G is then proven just as in (3) mutatis mutandis.
A clever -mouse implies ?
We show that we can de ne a variety of Prikry forcing, so that given an iterate M of the least clever -mouse, using this forcing over the Q M , we nd that the iteration points of M are appropriately generic, and yield a model of the form A c], and with the requisite indiscernibility properties.
The forcings themselves are quite straightforward, but as the conditions are proper classes over the admissible ground models concerned we have to do some routine checking that all the forcing properties we require can be e ected in KP. As we have seen the Q M di er in character depending on whether Lim( ) or not. Although we try to present as uniform a treatment as possible, we shall have to split into cases in some proof because of this dichotomy.
For q 2 On] <! we set jqj = sup ranq + 1. Let hP ; <i be the class of Prikry conditions de ned over a transitive, admissible, and amenable model hQ; Fi, where F is a Q--complete ultra lter on . That is hp; Xi exempli ed by these cases, and the rest amounts to bookkeeping in the product forcing. In these cases can be the identity!) Let P n = df (P (n) ) Q be the class of Prikry conditions de ned using F (n) over Q. Let n<! P n be the full direct product of the P n . De nition 3. Pis clearly 0 -de nable class over hQ; F n i.
The intention is that for certain Q-structures, certainC as above, we may de ne a Gc which is Q-generic for e P Q , by which we mean that G is Q-generic if G intersects all e P Q , 2 Q which are predense sets in Q. Recall 2 Q is predense if 8q 2 P9r 2 9q 00 r; we write e for fq j 9r 2 q rg -the class of extensions of .] The forcings P Q will be proper classes over both types of Q-structures.
For Q such a Q-structure we wish to de ne a rami ed forcing language and relation for e P Q . (See 19] for an example of such a construction.) Let Q = hJF ; 2;Fi. The language L ;F (or just L where the context is understood) is a ranked one: by induction one de nes C 2 Q a set of constants to name J~c wherec = hc n i n<! is a sequence where it is intended that hc !n+k j k < !i is going to be co nal in n for each n < ! and such that Gc will be generic in the sense above.
For < there are ranked variables x ; y ; z ; : : :, universally quanti ed ranked variables 8x etc., as well as unranked variables x; y; z; : : :. If C is de ned, C +1 can be taken as a set of terms of the form fx j (x )g where (x ) is a formula built up from the primitives _ 2; _ =;~_ c, propositional connectives, constants from S fC j g, and all quanti ed variables in (x ) are of rank at most . A sentence of L is ranked if all variables in it are ranked -and the ordinal rank is the maximum value of any ranked quanti er or constant term from a C occurring in it. This may all be done in a 1 way over any JF which is su ciently closed -say primitively recursively closed.
For sup n< n < 0 < , 0 also su ciently closed, then L 0 ;F L ;F and the de nitions of C for < 0 are the same over JF 0 as JF .
The usual inductive de nition of forcing for ranked sentences of L can now be made. We denote the relation of a condition deciding a formula by hhp n ; Y n iijj '. Lemma 3.1 Let Q = JF j = KP, letp = hhp i ; X i ii 2 e P Q ; ' a ranked sentence of L Then we can nd in a Q 1 (';p) way, Y n X n so that hhp n ; Y n iijj '; i.e. we can e ectively nd such a sequence Y n and we know the result of that decision.
Proof: By induction on the structure of '. This is only non-trivial for ' of the form 8x (x ). Case (i) 8m < ! (B) holds.
Using (1) (ii) For a predense set 2 Q, we sayp = hhp n ; X n ii 2 e P captures () 9m; 9k 0 ; : : :; k m < !8hq i i 2 i m X i ] ki hhp 0 q 0 ; X 0 i : : :hp m q m ; X m ihp m+1 ; X m+1 i : : :i 2 e : Proposition 3.3 Let 2 Q be predense,p 2 e P Q arbitrary. Then we can e ectively nd a sequence e X i X for i < ! and m; k 0 ; : : :; k m < ! so that hhp i ; e X i ii captures as witnessed by the integers m; k 0 ; : : :; k m .
Proof: Similar to that of the previous Lemma, again using the Rowbottom property inside of Q.
We leave this as an exercise.
Q.E.D. Fact 3.1 Let ; Q; e Q;~e F; i be as above. Let p i = hc ! (i)+1 ; : : :; c ! (i)+li i for i n (where is our xed enumeration de ned at the outset of this section). Let e i 2 C (i) ] <!^m ax e i < jp i j for i n. Letp This is just the generalisation to more measures of the corresponding fact cf 4]) that in a mouse with a single measure the iteration points are 1 -indiscernibles, and hence any measure one set de ned from a nite sequence~i of indiscernibles alone and elements in the range of the iteration map contains all the indiscernibles above their maximum, jij. Lemma 3.4 Let Gc = fp = hhp n ; X n ii 2 e Pj 8n < ! p n fc ! (n)+i g i<! p n X n g:
Then Gc is e Q-generic for e P.
Proof: Let Q.E.D.
We shall need the following simple consequence of the cleverness property. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3.7 Suppose Lim( ). Then hJ~c ;ci j = KP.
Proof: We rst note that 8 < 0 P( ) \ e Q = P( ) \ 1 (J~c ) But now if < we can similarly reason that if we de ne a bijection 0 : dom( 0 ) ?! with dom( 0 ) !, and 1 : dom( 1 ) ?! n a second bijection de ned just as was for (meaning that 1 (0) = if = + 1) then we may de ne e P using 1 and e P < using 0 and then e P = e P < e P .
As e P < 2 e Q, forcing with it preserves KP; if this is followed by e P , then as above all 1 (J~c ) bounded subsets of are added by e P < . We thus only have to show that there is no new 1 (J~c ) subset of . This is easily seen to be equivalent to showing that there is no co nal map of ! into e (by virtue of the sequence h n i n< i). Letp 4 Clever mice from Determinacy
In this section we shall assume ! 2 -1 1 sets are determined and prove the existence of clever -mice. That is, for a limit, we shall prove the existence of a mouse M whose corresponding Q-structure Q M = hJ~F ; 2;Fi j = KP + \F is an sequence of normal measures". For a successor we shall have that the topmost measure of the Q structure has the re ection or \cleverness" property of Def.1.10. We suppose that there are no clever -mice, and we shall derive a contradiction. In particular there can be no inner model with an -sequence of measurable cardinals. And the full Covering Lemma for K holds above the supremum of its measurable cardinals. We describe a game G that has an ! 2 -1 1 pay-o set, but such that neither player has a winning strategy, and this will be our contradiction.
x n y n x 1 y 1 z = (x 0 ; y 0 ; ; x n ; y n ; ) with z as the resulting run of play. We divide up ! as usual: let k : ! ! ! 2 + 2 be a recursive bijection. We think of I (respectively II) as constructing x (y respectively) for < ! 2 ; u = x ! 2 +1 (v = y ! 2 +1 ) and e I = x ! 2 (respectively e II = y ! 2 ). Let us reserve the letter i for the rest of this section as denoting either of the two players I or II. I (respectively II) plays an integer in the n'th round x n 2 x k(n) , (respectively y n 2 y k(n) ). The requirements on x and y are as follows.
A I : h!; e I ; hg I n i n<! ; ui must be a code of an !-model in a language L containing _ 2; h_ I n i n<! ; _ E I which will be interpreted as e I ; g I n ; u respectively; A I must be a model of the theory comprising: We use the notation K i = J _ E i n _ i for the appropriate version of K in i's model. If at any point I's moves fail to put x into the arithmetic set that the A I speci es, then I loses. If I does not lose, then II will lose unless his moves in y t the above speci cation for II.
If neither player loses due to these requirements, then we consider the following. B I n ; B II n : For < !n x (y ) must be a well order of ! with 8 0 < jx j > jy 0 j (respectively 8 0 jy j > jx 0 j ) (or for the least for which this is not true, if x is not a well order, or fails to have greater rank than y 0 for 0 < , then I loses, otherwise II loses).
These requirements on x; y, and so z, are specifying an !:n-1 1 set. If nobody has lost due to these requirements, set n = supfjx j; jy j : < !:ng where jwj denotes the order type of w provided the latter is a wellorder.
C I n ; C II n : If in A I the interpretation of _ I n is not (isomorphic to) n then I loses. If I does not lose here, then n must also be the interpretation of _ II n in A II or II will lose.
Notice that once we have established that all x ; y 2 WO for < !:n then hg I n ; e I n g I n g I n i = h n ; 2i is an arithmetic requirement on e I (and similarly for e II ). If nobody loses at C i n then we shall (And similarly we may de ne M II .) Usually however, we simply identify the wellfounded parts of A i with the transitive sets to which they are isomorphic.
At the end of play then the loser is the \owner of" the least requirement violated in the ordering: A I ; A II ; : : :;B I n ; B II n ; C I n ; C II n ; B I n+1 ; : : : for n < ! ; otherwise II wins. The game is ! -1 1 as indicated by the comments along the way. One should perhaps note that despite all these requirements, there is no obligation as part of any rule of the game that anyone plays out a non-trivial mouse: they are quite at liberty to play out models whose K are just segments of L.
For s 2 ! ! let C s be the class of s-admissibles and their limits. Lemma 4.1 Player I has no winning strategy in G. Proof: Suppose otherwise and let I have a winning strategy in G. Let C = C . By the Covering Lemma for K singular cardinals 2 C above the supremum of K's measurables are singular in K. Since C is closed and unbounded in every uncountable cardinal, we may, by passing to a generic extension if need be, pick a sequence of K-cardinals h n j n < ! i, closed beneath its supremum, and with each n 2 C and ful lling the requirements set out in Clause 4. of A II :
We may further assume any measurable cardinal of K is less than 0 . (If is a winning strategy for I in V it will also be such in any set generic extension by absoluteness of the de nition of ! 2 -1 1 sets.) So II will play out e II As is winning for I, I plays his model h!; e I ; hg I n i n<! ; ui satisfying A I according to ; for any n < ! I does not lose for failing to construct wellorders y for < !:n, and does not lose on account of B I n ; by the boundedness above, n = supfjx j; jy j : < !:ng and indeed the interpretations of _ I n ; _ II n are both (isomorphic to) n . So C II n is always satis able for player II. We note that this de nition of coiteration makes sense for models (M I ; M II ) with perhaps illfounded iterates, as long as we stick to comparing the wellfounded parts. The coiteration will then halt at some point where those wellfounded parts agree, or are initial segments of one another as usual. We shall thus have: (ii) M I j = \F is the normal measure on !( +1) " ) F is the nal segment lter generated by h ! +k jk < !i^8j M i j 2 A i . Proof: We prove this in (4)- (9) . The point is that there should be an orderly transition of any measures appearing due to truncations onto the ordinals !( +1) . We want to check that, for example, if = !:2, that in the coiteration up to !:2 we don't have a mouse M I j appearing with measurables of order type at a stage j greater than ! whilst for j ! we had that M I j was only a k-mouse for some nite k. is singular of co nality > ! " whilst M II j0 will think it regular. This contradicts that I ! ; !( +1) is the identity map. That the measures are so generated follows from the Note in (4) above. This completes (ii). If 0 0 , then we have that ! 0+1 > j0 as this follows from the fact that ! 0+1 is singular in M I j0 but regular in M II 0 and hence so eventually in M II . To nish (i): if 0 = 0 we have just stated that 1 > j0 and the rest is trivial; if Lim( 0 ) then 0 is a limit of measurables in M I ! 0 thus j0 = ! 0 would imply a mouse with a measurable limit of measurables, which is beyond our global assumptions. Lastly if 0 = + 1 then in M I j0 j = \ !( +1) is measurable", and both models have the common lter F 0 at 0 = df !( +1) generated by h ! +k jk < !i. Then For (iii) we note that: Proof: A II is wellfounded up to , and A II j = \ < K n is a wellfounded relation of rank < ( + n ) K < ". Hence this relation is truely wellfounded (irrespective of whether the premice in K II are truely mice or not). Hence we cannot have in nitely many truncations on the II side below .
Q.E.D. (7) But now, the iteration maps satisfy i 0;j0 2 A i even though the actual iteration is de ned outside these models; each iteration is in fact \equivalent" to one de nable inside the model, and that ends up with an identical iteration map i 0;j0 , the only di erence being that one side of the coiteration is \padded out" with a lot of identity maps, whilst the other side is taking some ultrapowers. From these remarks (iii) follows.
Q.E.D.(6)
Let l be maximal so that ! l jl if such exists, otherwise set l = 0. By induction and using similar, but simpler, reasoning (which we leave to the reader) we obtain: The following will conclude (3).
(9) = and M I is an -mouse. Proof: Suppose < . As J i are both non-empty, there would be some < ! with K i j = \jM i j < " for i 2 fI; IIg. But this means the mouse M I and premouse M II coiterate to (M I ; M II ) with both of the latter wellfounded. By soundness considerations, we must have equality between the two nal structures. But then M II is a mouse and core(M I ) = core(M II ) and this would contradict the de nition of coiteration. cannot be greater than since M I j is at most an -mouse and all measures in M I are generated by sequences common to both models. Hence M I j + 1 = M II j + 1 and E M I contains no lters with critical points larger than . Hence = . But M I must be at least an -mouse, since if it were less than this the coiteration would require only many steps for some < .
Q.E.D. (9) Q.E.D. (10) It is easy to see that ot(J II ) = ! although we do not use this fact. In the notation of (10) 
